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Abstract: 
 
Much has been written about the impact of over-education on wages using cross-sectional 
data, although there have been few studies that analyse the returns to over-education in a 
dynamic setting. This paper adds to the existing literature by using panel data to 
investigate the impact and permanence of over-education wage penalties, whilst 
controlling for unobserved individual heterogeneity. Our fixed effects estimates suggest 
that the over-education wage penalty cannot solely be explained by unobserved 
heterogeneity. Over-education is permanent for many workers since around 50 percent of 
workers over-educated in 1991 are still over-educated in 2005. However, we also show 
that these workers are of lower quality compared to around 25 percent who find a match 
within five years of being over-educated. Finally, there is a significant scarring effect for 
workers over-educated in 1991 since they never fully reach parity compared to those who 
were matched in 1991, although this is not the case for graduates who manage to find a 
match within 5 years. 
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I INTRODUCTION 
 
Numerous studies have observed the phenomenon of over-education, whereby 
individuals perform jobs for which they are apparently overqualified, and have 
investigated its effects.  There is now a convincing body of evidence that consistently 
shows that an individual who is over-educated for their job will earn more than their 
colleagues who are correctly qualified, but less than individuals with the same education 
level as them, who have found an appropriate job.  In other words, while there are some 
wage returns to the years of unused education for over-educated individuals, they suffer a 
penalty in that they do not obtain the full return that they could expect if they were to 
work in a job that fully utilised their education level.   
 
Almost all the evidence in the literature on this relationship uses cross-sectional data.  
This paper uses panel data from the UK, in order to answer three key questions about 
over-education: 
(i) How much of the wage penalty associated with over-education is due to 
unobserved characteristics of individuals, which made them more likely to 
appear overeducated in the first place? 
(ii) Is the wage penalty associated with over-education constant across all 
individuals, or does it vary according to whether the individuals concerned 
subsequently move out of the over-educated state into a matched job? 
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(iii) Do those individuals who do escape over-education into a matched job 
achieve similar wage outcomes to those who were always matched, or are 
they always at a disadvantage in the labour market? 
The underlying theme behind each of these questions is whether there are differences in 
the unobserved characteristics between individuals who are over-educated and those who 
are not, and those who escape over-education and those who do not.  The answers to 
these questions will greatly improve our understanding of the causes and consequences of 
over-education. 
 
The impact of over-education on wages is an important policy issue, given the significant 
rise in higher education (HE) participation in recent years, both in the UK and other 
countries. The Higher Education Initial Participation Rate (HEIPR) shows that 43% of 
English young people have participated in Higher Education by the age of 30
i
.  Although 
the definition of the rate has changed slightly over time, a similar participation rate was 
below 20% at the beginning of the 1990s, with much of the subsequent growth occurring 
before 2000.  Below degree level, the number of seventeen year olds still in education in 
the UK increased from 672,000 in 1995/6 to 807,000 in 2005/6, while their achievement 
rates increased at the same time (for example, the proportion of participants achieving 2 
or more A Levels, i.e. reaching Level 3 on the National Qualifications Framework 
(NQF), increased from 30% to 37% over the same period.
ii
) These figures imply an 
increase in the number of qualified workers who have recently entered, and will continue 
to enter, the UK labour market, as in most other countries.  
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The next section of the paper describes in more detail the various theories that have been 
proposed to explain the existence of over-education, focussing on the unobserved 
heterogeneity argument that is the subject of this paper.  This will be followed by two 
sections explaining the empirical methodology and the data set to be used.  Sections V-
VII contain the results of the analysis, each focussing on one of the questions highlighted 
above.  The final section offers some conclusions. 
 
II WHY MIGHT OVER-EDUCATION EXIST? 
 
Various reasons have been put forward for why over-education might exist. One of the 
earliest contributions was that of Freeman (1976), who suggested that aggregate over-
education should be a short-term disequilibrium phenomenon. If there is an over-supply 
of skilled workers, this should be followed by a fall in the wage return to their skills, 
which in turn should either reduce supply again, or increase employer demand for skills, 
until any excess supply of skilled labour is eliminated.  Previous evidence in the over-
education literature, for many countries and many points in time from the early 1980s 
onwards, suggests aggregate over-education is a permanent feature of modern labour 
markets.  In addition, there is little evidence of any recent decline in the graduate wage 
premium, as predicted by this theory.  It therefore seems that over-education at the 
aggregate level is not caused, in the main, by an over-supply of skilled workers.  
Research has therefore looked to the level of individuals workers and jobs to explain the 
existence of over-education. 
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Three potential explanations have been identified in the literature.  These are that (i) even 
though aggregate over-education is a permanent phenomenon, over-education is 
temporary for the individuals concerned, who have entered a firm at a level below their 
skill level, but who quickly expect to be promoted within the firm as they gain 
experience
iii
; (ii) that individuals have restricted mobility in the labour market, perhaps 
due to family constraints, and have to accept a local job, even if it is not commensurate 
with their skills
iv
; and (iii) that individuals with the same level of education are 
heterogeneous in their abilities, so that the less able may be apparently over-educated in 
terms of their actual qualifications, but actually have skills that are commensurate with 
their jobs. 
 
It is this third explanation for over-education that this paper focuses on.  The three wage 
equation analyses described in the introduction will all investigate the existence of 
unobserved heterogeneity in skills, and their link to over-education.  In particular, the 
analysis in Section V will examine how much of the wage penalty associated with over-
education disappears once we control for unobserved heterogeneity, which would be 
consistent with the idea that heterogeneity in skills was responsible for that part of the 
wage penalty rather than the over-education status itself.  In the limit, where wages are 
only a function of individual characteristics and not at all a function of job characteristics, 
as Human Capital Theory contends, then an implication of this idea is that, if we can 
successfully control for unobserved heterogeneity, then over-education wage penalties 
should disappear completely, and individuals should earn the same whatever job they do. 
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The second wage analysis in Section VI considers the variation in the wage penalty 
associated with over-education, according to whether or not the individuals concerned 
subsequently move out of the over-educated state into a matched job.  If the original 
over-education penalty is the same for both groups of individuals, this would suggest that 
the observed over-education is actually an under-use of skills for those who find 
themselves in this situation (due perhaps to reasons i or ii above), with wages being 
determined by the jobs that they do.  On the other hand, if the original over-education 
penalty is smaller for those who subsequently leave over-education, this would suggest 
that wages are being determined by characteristics of the individuals as well, with the 
difference in wage penalties amongst the initially over-educated reflecting heterogeneous 
abilities, which are unobserved in the data but are, presumably, observed by future 
employers. 
 
Finally, the analysis in Section VII considers the difference in wages between individuals 
who have always worked in a matched job, and individuals who now work in a matched 
job but were previously over-educated.  If there is no such difference in wages, the earlier 
over-education wage penalty suffered by the latter group can be attributed to the 
characteristics of their previous job, and therefore genuine over-education. However, if 
the previously over-educated never catch up, in terms of their wages, with those who 
were always matched, this would suggest lower unobserved heterogeneous ability 
influencing their current wages, and hence also their previous over-education experience. 
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Analysis of the ‘heterogeneous ability’ hypothesis has been provided by a limited number 
of previous papers. Some studies have shown that observed factors associated with ability 
help determine over-education status.  For example, Buchel and Pollmann-Schult (2001) 
show that individuals with similar levels of formal education in West Germany differ in 
their likelihood of being overqualified, with these differences being related to school 
achievement and type of vocational training undertaken. Alternatively, the over-educated 
may not have low skills, but simply the ‘wrong’ skill for the labour market.  In the UK, 
Dolton and Vignoles (2000) find that graduates of social sciences, arts and languages are 
more likely to be over-qualified than graduates of subjects in high demand and short 
supply in the labour market, such as engineering and sciences. Frenette (2004) obtains 
similar findings in Canada, with graduates in fine arts, humanities, social sciences and 
agricultural and biological sciences being less likely to find graduate level work, relative 
to graduates in education, engineering, computer science, law and medicine. 
 
Although there is a large literature looking at the wage penalty to over-education
v
, 
relatively few studies have used the wage equation results to infer the causes of over-
education.  Exceptions include Chevalier (2003), who measures unobserved skills via the 
residual from a wage equation based on earnings in graduates’ first job, and finds that the 
inclusion of such unobserved skills in the wage equation for the current job reduces the 
pay penalty on over-education, but only by a small amount (around 8%).  Allen and van 
der Velden (2001) and Green and McIntosh (2007) both include a measure of skill 
utilisation in their wage equations to capture whether workers are well matched or not in 
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terms of their actual skills rather than their qualifications.  Both find only a small 
reduction in the wage penalty to over-education when skill utilisation is controlled for. 
 
Panel data have rarely been used in the literature when estimating the wage impact of 
over-education.  Bauer (2002) uses German Socio-Economic Panel data, to show that the 
penalty to over-education declines when fixed effects are included in the wage equation 
to control for unobserved heterogeneity.  Similar findings are obtained by Frenette (2004) 
for Canada.  Our first wage equation analysis replicates these results for the UK.  No 
other papers, however, have used panel data to undertake the two other analyses of wage 
equations that follow in this paper, to the best of our knowledge. 
 
III METHODOLOGY 
 
In the analysis that follows, qualifications are measured in terms of the highest level 
achieved, on a scale from NQF Level 0 (no qualifications) to NQF Level 6 (tertiary 
qualifications), as shown in Table 1.  Worker i is defined as over-educated if his actual 
highest qualification (HQit) exceeds the required highest qualification in his occupation j 
(RQijt) at time t. Following studies such as Battu and Sloane (2004), Bauer (2002), Kiker 
et al. (1997) and Mendes de Oliveira et al. (2000), we measure required qualifications as 
the modal highest qualification in each occupation, measured at the 3 digit level in the 
Standard Occupational Classification.  This methodology is a variation of that originally 
proposed by Verdugo and Verdugo (1989), who measured the required amount of 
education by the mean level of education amongst workers in the individual’s occupation, 
 11 
and defined someone to be over-educated if their actual education level was at least one 
standard deviation above this mean level.  Using the mode rather than the mean seems 
preferable as it does not require the arbitrary use of one standard deviation, and it will be 
less affected by outliers, as argued by Mendes de Oliveira et al. (2000).
vi
   
 
Whether the mean or mode is used, one criticism of this methodology to measure 
required education is that it is determined by actual qualifications held, rather than by the 
requirements of the job.  If there is a general rise in the qualification level of the 
population, then we would expect the average qualifications of workers hired in all 
occupations to rise (the mean immediately, and the mode only after the tipping point in 
the most frequent qualification is reached).  Thus, even if the job requirements have not 
changed at all, an increase in qualifications held will increase the measured required 
education and so lead to an underestimate of the incidence of over-education.  We do not 
think that this is a serious problem over the period considered however.  The wage gap 
between the high- and low-educated has not fallen at any point over the last 25 years in 
the UK, and increased rapidly at certain points in time, particularly in the 1980s.  The 
large literature seeking to explain this rise in wage inequality has generally concluded 
that the demand for skilled or educated workers has risen faster than the supply
vii
.  We 
therefore do not think that our chosen measure of required qualifications is unduly 
affected by such grade inflation, where higher qualifications are asked for simply because 
they are available in the workforce, rather than actually required.   
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To assess the effect of education on earnings, we estimate a variation of the over- 
required and under-required (ORU) specification of Hartog (1997).  Our model includes 
dummy variables for each level of required education (RQ
m
it) for m=1…6, NQF Level 0 
forming the reference category.  Over-education is measured using 5 dummy variables 
(D
k
it) showing the distance (number of levels) between actual and required qualifications 
when this value is positive (k levels where k=1…5).  No individual in the sample has an 
over-education distance value of 6, i.e. no individual has a postgraduate qualification 
(NQF Level 6) and works in a job requiring no qualifications (NQF Level 0).  This 
flexible specification therefore allows returns to required education and over-education to 
increase non-linearly across levels.  A categorical variable is also included to indicate 
levels of under-education, SUit.
viii
 
itit
5
it5
1
it1
6
it6
1
it1itit εSUμDδ...DδRQγ...RQγXβY ++++++++=  (1) 
Yit are real (2005 prices) log gross weekly earnings and Xit contains relevant socio-
economic and job characteristics for worker i at time t, that can explain earnings. 
 
We estimate the parameters in equation (1) first using OLS, and then using a fixed effect 
estimator to allow for the possibility that unobserved heterogeneity biases the parameters 
through correlation between education and the error term εit.  If unobserved heterogeneity 
is the only reason why individuals work in jobs for which they are apparently over-
educated, then once we control for this, an individual should earn the same whatever job 
they do, determined by their abilities.  If this is the case, then the returns to an 
incremental level of over-education, δk – δk-1, should be the same as the returns to an 
incremental level of required education, γm – γm-1. 
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The second piece of analysis presented in Section VI examines variation in the estimated 
returns to over-education, according to whether or not the individual subsequently moves 
into a matched job, estimated at four points in time: 1991, 1996, 2001 and 2005.  The 
analysis is performed by interacting a variable indicating the amount (number of levels) 
of over-education experienced by the individual at time t, OLit, with an indicator of 
whether the individual is still over-educated in the subsequent period, OEit+1.  In order to 
reduce the number of interaction terms in the estimated equations, over-education returns 
are constrained to be linear in this specification, rather than estimated via a series of 
dummy variables for each level.  This is equation 3 below.  Before estimating this 
specification, a specification without interactions but with the linear over-education 
variable, OLit, was estimated for the same four years (1991, 1996, 2001 and 2005) to 
provide a comparison.  This specification is shown in equation 2. 
ititit
6
it6
1
it1itit εSUμOLαRQγ...RQγXβY ++++++=  (2) 
itit1ititit
6
it6
1
it1itit εSUμ)OE*OL(πOLφRQγ...RQγXβY +++++++= + (3) 
The subsequent over-education variable, OEit+1, was interacted with the over-education 
variable rather than the required education variables, because the former is picking up the 
returns to individual characteristics while the latter is picking up the returns to job level 
characteristics.  Since the interaction term is included to determine whether the wage 
returns vary by unobserved individual characteristics, as proxied by future job-matching, 
then interacting it with the over-education variable is more appropriate. 
 
Finally, Section VII investigates whether the over-education penalty is related to the 
characteristics of the job or to the characteristics of workers in over-educated jobs, by 
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analysing whether the wage penalty stays with individuals after they move into an 
appropriately-matched job, when compared to individuals who were always matched.
ix
 
To do this, wage equations are estimated on samples of workers in matched jobs at 
t=1996, 2001 and 2005 respectively, which include a dummy variable for whether 
individual i was over-educated at t=1991, OEit=1991  .
x
 This is equation 4. 
itit1991it
6
it6
1
it1itit εSUμOEλRQγ...RQγXβY ++++++= =       (4) 
Hence λ measures the pay differential in 1996, 2001 and 2005, between workers who 
were always in an appropriately matched job, and workers who were over-educated in 
1991.   
 
Finally, we estimate equation 4 again including an interaction between whether the 
individual was over-educated in 1991 (OEit=1991) and a variable indicating that the 
individual’s highest qualification is a degree (HQ
5
it)
xi
.  This specification allows us to 
determine whether the effect of a history of over-education on future matched wages is 
the same for graduates and non-graduates.  This is equation 5. 
itit1991it
5
it1991it
6
it6
1
it1itit εSUμ)OE*HQ(σOEθRQγ...RQγXβY +++++++= ==  (5) 
In this specification, σ measures the difference in the penalty to previous (1991) over-
education between graduates and non-graduates. 
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IV DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE INFORMATION 
 
The British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) is a longitudinal survey of households in 
Great Britain.
xii
  The first wave of data was collected in 1991 with the survey then 
repeated each year.  We use date from the first 15 waves (1991-2005).  In the first wave, 
a nationally representative sample of 10,000 individuals, in 5,000 households, were 
interviewed from 250 areas of Great Britain.  In subsequent years these same individuals 
were re-interviewed, as were any new members of their household, plus members of the 
new households of any individuals who left their original household, as well as new 
households to replace any households that left the survey.  Information was collected at 
both the individual and household level, and includes individual questions on human 
capital and qualifications, as well as socio-economic characteristics such as income, 
employment status and region of residence, and job characteristics such as promotion 
prospects and firm tenure. 
 
The BHPS data have been used to generate an unbalanced panel which includes all 
subsequent households added to the survey after 1991, and also a balanced panel. This 
provides an unbalanced working sample of 31,776 male and 34,904 female observations, 
of individuals in paid employment, whilst the balanced panel consists of 9,810 male and 
9,660 female observations.
xiii
 Table A1 in the appendix provides summary statistics for 
real weekly pay, as well as all the explanatory variables used throughout the analysis.  
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Given that the Quarterly Labour Force Survey (QLFS) has a much larger sample size 
than the BHPS, these data are used to calculate required qualifications (RQj) using the 
modal qualification by occupation category j averaged across 1993-2003.   Table 1 
compares the HQi variable in the BHPS with that calculated using a working age sample 
of men and women from the QLFS, 1993-2003.  Table 1 also compares HQi for the 
earliest common period in each data set (1993).  Whilst the distribution of HQi is close 
across the two datasets in 1993, there is some evidence of non-random attrition in the 
BHPS pooled data, since there are slightly more people at the top end of the qualification 
distribution, compared to the QLFS. This suggests that the later periods in the BHPS are 
less nationally representative than the earlier periods.  
     <Table 1 here> 
Using the QLFS, we generated the required qualification (RQj) variable using the mode 
level of HQi by three-digit Standard Occupational Classification (SOC90), averaged over 
the full 11 year period for which such data were available.
xiv
  This RQj variable was then 
matched into the BHPS by SOC90. As a consequence of the BHPS attrition, we expect to 
slightly over-estimate the true extent of over-education using the pooled BHPS data. The 
raw BHPS data show that 27 of men and 25 percent of women were over-educated in 
1991.  
 
To investigate whether over-education is permanent, Table 2 looks at transitions out of 
over-education for a balanced panel of 654 men and 644 women employed between 1991 
and 2005. The first row shows that after 5 years, 26 percent of men and 23 percent of 
women over-educated in 1991 found a match, which implies that 74 percent of men and 
 17 
77 percent of women were still over-educated. This falls to 53 percent of men and 59 
percent of women after 15 years (100 men and 107 women, out of the 189 men and 180 
women over-educated in 1991, were still over-educated in 2005). So half of those over-
educated in 1991 eventually find a match by 2005. Table 2 also shows though that the 
likelihood of leaving over-education falls the longer workers are over-educated since an 
increasing percentage over time remain over-educated from one period to the next 
     <Table 2 here> 
V PANEL DATA ANALYSIS OF ORU EARNINGS EQUATIONS 
 
The aim of this section is to use the BHPS data to estimate wage equations to investigate 
whether the wage penalties to over-education, that are typically observed in the literature, 
are still observed when we use the panel nature of our data to estimate fixed effects 
equations.
xv
 This will determine how much of the observed wage penalty can be 
explained by unobserved heterogeneity.   
 
The existing empirical literature shows that over-educated workers receive a wage 
penalty, their earnings ranging between 15 and 37 percent less than their appropriately-
matched peers using recent cohorts.
xvi
 However controlling for self-reported skills 
(Chevalier and Lindley, 2006) and taking unobserved heterogeneity into consideration 
(Chevalier, 2003) reduces this pay penalty. 
<Table 3 here> 
Table 3 presents the key educational returns for the ORU earnings equations estimated 
using OLS and fixed effects, as defined by equation (1).
xvii
  The first column shows the 
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standard OLS wage equation using the ORU specification for men.  As expected, the 
incremental return to a level of required education is almost always greater than that to all 
over-education levels. The largest increment for required education is a move from Level 
2 to Level 3 (0.27 log percentage points or 31 percent) followed by a move from Level 4 
to Level 5 (0.23 log percentage points or 26 percent). In comparison each incremental 
level of over-education is associated with around a 0.04 – 0.07 log percentage points (5 – 
7 percent) increase in wages.
xviii
  Another finding of interest is that the returns to required 
education are higher for women than for men, whilst the returns to over-education are 
lower for women, comparing columns 1 and 3. 
 
The second and fourth columns in Table 3 provide the fixed effects estimates for men and 
women respectively in the ORU model.
xix
 Once we control for individuals’ unobserved 
heterogeneity, we would expect an individual to earn the same whatever job they do, if 
over-education is simply an indicator of unobserved heterogeneity, and therefore the 
penalties would be close to zero. Also controlling for fixed effects, men and women still 
earn different amounts depending on the level of job they do, suggesting that the over-
education wage penalty is not simply a penalty for low ability.  As an aside, the return to 
under-education is negative and smaller than the weighted average for required 
education, which is in keeping with the consensus in the existing literature (see Hartog 
2000). 
 
The penalties to over-education cannot be read directly from Table 3, therefore Table 4 
summarises the predicted wage premia at each job level for a particular education group, 
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namely graduates (HQ Level 5), all measured relative to individuals with no 
qualifications working in a matched job, and calculated using the estimated coefficients 
in Table 3.  The wage penalties to working in a non-graduate job for these graduates can 
then more clearly be seen as the difference between the predicted wage premia at Level 
m (for m<5) relative to the Level 5 wage premium.  These wage penalties are given in 
parentheses in each row of Table 4, for added clarity. 
  
The upper panel of Table 4 refers to the OLS estimates.  The first row shows that 
matched graduate men earn on average 0.77 log percentage points more than unqualified 
men working in matched jobs. The subsequent rows show lower wage premia, relative to 
unqualified men again, for graduate men working in all job below graduate level.  For 
example, a graduate man employed in a non-graduate job (say RQ Level 3, so he has 2 
levels of over-education) would receive a wage return to his qualifications of 0.67 log 
percentage points more than a matched man employed in an occupation that requires no 
qualifications.  Hence, his over-education penalty is 0.09 log percentage points (10 
percent).   A similar wage penalty (13 percent) is suffered if the graduate man works in a 
Level 4 job, while the penalties are significantly larger if he is excessively over-educated 
and works in a Level 1 or Level 2 job. 
<Table 4 here> 
Since the returns to required education are higher for women than for men, whilst the 
returns to over-education are lower, consequently the over-education penalties are also 
higher for women. For example the over-education penalty for graduates employed in a 
job that requires Level 3 qualifications is 0.09 log percentage points (10 percent) for men 
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and 0.25 log percentage points (28 percent) for women. This is consistent with the 
literature since Lindley (2008) finds an estimated over-education penalty of 29 percent 
for women for QLFS data averaged over 1993-2002. 
 
The second panel in Table 4 provides similar wage premia and over-education penalties 
for graduates, based on the fixed effects estimates.  Once we control for individuals’ 
unobserved heterogeneity, we would expect an individual to earn the same whatever job 
they do, if over-education is a proxy for lower ability. Hence we would expect the over-
education penalties to be zero. Table 4 shows that the over-education penalties for the 
fixed effects model are lower than the OLS, as expected, but they do not disappear. Thus, 
once we control for unobserved heterogeneity, a wage penalty still exists, that grows 
(non-linearly) with the extent of over-education.  So unobserved heterogeneity appears to 
be responsible for a significant proportion of the over-education effects, but cannot be the 
only explanation for the existence of over-education, which is consistent with Chevalier 
(2003). 
 
There are two more issues to address concerning the estimated wage equations in this 
section.  First, of necessity, they are estimated on a sample of individuals who are in 
work.  We therefore estimated Heckman selection models for employed status before the 
wage equations were estimated, but found the results presented above to be unaffected, 
both qualitatively and quantitatively.
xx
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Second, in the fixed effects estimates, the effect of over-education on wages is identified 
by workers making transitions between differently matched jobs.  It is reasonable to 
suspect that such transitions will not be entirely random, and therefore the fixed effects 
estimates of the wage returns to over-education may not be typical of these received by 
all over-educated workers.  We therefore turn to our other wage analyses, to search for 
further evidence on the unobserved heterogeneity theory. 
 
VI RETURNS TO OVER-EDUCATION BY FUTURE MATCHED 
STATUS 
 
Table 5 provides the results for equations (2) – (5) where these have been estimated on 
workers observed in 1991, 1996, 2001 and 2005, for a sample of pooled men and women 
in order to maintain sensible sample sizes. 
 
Equation 2 is estimated for both an unbalanced and a balanced panel.  This is the ORU 
wage equation as estimated in the previous section, except now estimated separately by 
year, and with the extent of over-education entered as a single variable.  This is estimated 
in order to provide a base for the following results, which share these same 
characteristics.  The over-education returns increased slightly from 0.065 to 0.08 log 
percentage points per level of over-education between 2001 and 2005, suggesting a slight 
increase in such returns. The results estimated on the 1298 individuals in the balanced 
panel in 1991, 1996, 2001 and 2005, tell a similar story. 
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The estimated results from equation 3 allow the estimated returns to over-education in 
any year to differ according to whether or not workers are subsequently matched, 
estimated on the balanced panel.    The results show that the over-education return 
received in 1991 ( φˆ ) for those working in an over-educated job in 1991 was 0.12 log 
percentage points per level of over-education for those who subsequently found a match 
in 1996 compared to 0.04 log percentage points ( piφ ˆˆ − ) for those who were still over-
educated in 1996 (and compared to the average over-education return of 0.06 percentage 
points found in the equation 2 results for the balanced panel).  These results therefore 
show that, holding constant job requirements at a particular level, there will be variation 
in the wage penalty suffered by over-educated employees working at that level.  Those 
who will have found a matched job five years later are already earning a higher wage (a 
smaller over-education wage penalty) during their period of over-education.  This 
suggests that the over-education penalty is not simply a function of the lower status job 
that over-educated individuals find themselves in, but is also a function of the 
heterogeneity of the workers themselves. This is consistent with the idea that workers 
with higher quality skills are earning more in their over-educated job and are more likely 
to move into a matched job. In other words, there are (at least) two types of over-
educated workers: those who are temporarily over-educated but find a match within five 
years (around 25 percent of the sample according to Table 2) and those who take longer 
to find a match, who are of lower ability. Thus, heterogeneous ability again seems to be 
part of the story behind over-education. 
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The following rows in the 1991 column of Table 5 show that the further into the future a 
worker has to wait before they get matched, the smaller their advantage in terms of 
returns to over-education in 1991, relative to those who never get matched, since the pi  
coefficients decline in size and are no longer statistically significant.  Thus, in the 
hierarchy of over-educated workers, those who find a matched job sooner, earn higher 
wages whilst still over-educated, suggesting that they were of higher quality in the first 
place.  
 
Similar results are observed in subsequent years, with the coefficient on the interaction 
term between over-education levels and future over-education status also being negative, 
though it fails to obtain statistical significance again.  As Table 2 showed, however, the 
numbers observed in the data set who are still overeducated in the later years do become 
quite small, which may explain the lack of statistical significance.  One finding that the 
shown by the subsequent rows of results for equation 3 is that, for those individuals who 
find a match in 2005, their returns to over-education increase as they get closer to their 
match date, as shown by ( φˆ ) at 1991, 1997 and 2001 in the `found a match in 2005' row.  
 
VII WAGE PENALTIES TO PREVIOUS OVER-EDUCATION 
STATUS 
 
The lower rows in Table 5 show the results of estimating equations 4 and 5, which reveal 
the impact of previous over-education status on the wages of workers who are now 
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matched.  In particular, the equation 4 results show that, amongst matched workers in 
1996, 2001 and 2005, those who were over-educated in 1991 but then subsequently found 
a match, earn 0.10 - 0.12 log percentage points (11-13 percent) lower wages compared to 
those who were already matched in 1991 ( λˆ ).  Thus, once again wages are shown to be 
determined not just by the characteristics (level) of the jobs, but also the unobserved 
ability of the workers who fill them, here indicated by prior over-education experience.  
Thus, holding job requirements constant at a particular level (and therefore holding actual 
qualifications constant at the same level, since equation 4 is estimated only on matched 
workers), lower wages, presumably reflecting lower unobserved ability, are observed for 
those individuals who were previously over-educated.  Over-education is again at least in 
part determined by unobserved ability. 
 
The final rows in Table 5 show that the negative impact of previous over-education on 
matched wages is not present for graduates who find a match within 5 years, since in 
1996 graduates who were previously over-educated in 1991 earn the same as (actually an 
insignificant 0.004 log percentage points (0.4 percent) more than) workers who were 
already matched in 1991.
xxi
  Thus, over-education is not an indication of lower ability 
within a qualification category for graduates who found a job within five years. Such a 
relatively short period of over-education for graduates can be seen as a natural event with 
no future consequences, as they learn about a firm or job, before being offered 
responsibilities commensurate with their skills.  For non-graduates and graduates who 
taker longer than 5 years to find a match, over-education is apparently an indicator of 
lower ability, given the permanent wage penalty suffered by such individuals even when 
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matched, again providing evidence that those who find a match within 5 years are of 
higher ability relative to those who take longer.  
 
VIII CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
 
This paper has estimated a range of wage equation analyses, in order to investigate the 
hypothesis that over-education is, at least in part, an indicator of lower ability among 
groups of workers who are identically qualified, but who have heterogeneous unobserved 
abilities.  Key evidence in support of this argument is that, amongst those workers who 
were over-educated in 1991, they did not all receive the same wage penalty to that over-
education, even when conditioned on the level of required qualifications in their jobs.  
The over-education wage penalty was systematically smaller (only 4 percent rather than 
13 per cent) amongst those workers who would be in a matched job five years later, in 
1996.  This result suggests some heterogeneity amongst the overeducated, such that those 
with the lowest ability (and hence the lowest wages) remain over-educated longer.  It 
must be admitted that amongst the over-educated in 1996 and 2001, we do not observe a 
statistically significant difference in the over-education wage penalty between those who 
subsequently find a matched job and those who do not, although the penalty is 
consistently smaller (wages are higher) for those who do go on to find a matched job, and 
small cell sizes, causing large standard errors and lower t-statistics is the probable cause 
of the statistical insignificance. 
 
 26 
The previous result therefore suggests some heterogeneity in skills amongst the over-
educated, with the more highly skilled (as indicated by higher initial earnings) being 
more likely to escape over-education.  Results in the paper also suggest, however, that 
there is heterogeneity of skills between those who experience a period of over-education 
within the sample period and those who do not, holding constant the level of actual 
qualifications obtained.  This is evidenced by the fact that a matched worker who was 
previously over-educated in 1991 earns less than a worker in the same level job who was 
always appropriately matched.  The systematically lower wages at the same job level 
amongst those with a history of prior over-education is again taken as an indicator of 
lower unobserved ability amongst this group.  An exception to this result, however, is 
amongst graduates who leave over-education within 5 years.  For this group, there is no 
wage penalty to their prior over-education once they are in a matched job.  Temporary 
over-education amongst graduates therefore need not be an indicator of lower ability, but 
may simply be part of the normal work history of some graduates as they acquire the 
work experience necessary to complement their higher level qualifications before they 
can move into graduate-level jobs. 
 
Our results therefore indicate three levels of unobserved ability.  From highest to lowest 
these exist amongst workers who were always in a matched job, then amongst workers 
who were over-educated but subsequently find a matched job, and finally amongst 
workers who remain over-educated.  Given this, we would expect to find that controlling 
for unobserved heterogeneity would explain some of the difference in wages between 
currently matched and over-educated workers.  This is exactly what is observed in 
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Section V above, where a substantial portion of the over-education wage penalty 
observed in the OLS wage equation is removed once we control for unobserved 
heterogeneity.  A significant proportion of the over-education that we observe is therefore 
due to unobserved heterogeneity, such that apparent over-education is actually 
individuals working in jobs that are commensurate with their actual skills. 
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Table 1: Highest qualification (percent). 
  
BHPS 
 
LFS 
   
1993 
 
1991-2005 
 
1993 
 
1993-2003 
HNQF=0, No Qualifications  23 16 24 18 
HNQF=1, <lower secondary    13 12 13 14 
HNQF=2, lower secondary      22 19 20 21 
HNQF=3, upper secondary      23 25 23 24 
HNQF=4, post-secondary         9 12 10 10 
HNQF=5, tertiary undergraduate  9 13 8 9 
HNQF=6, tertiary postgraduate  2 3 2 4 
N 6,578 98,949 52,715 529,745 
 Notes: All men and women, age 16-65. 
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Table 2: Over-education (OE) Permanence for a Balanced Sample of Men and 
Women in 1991, 1996, 2001 and 2005. 
 
  
1991 
 
 
1996 
 
2001 
 
2005 
 Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women 
OE 189 180 140 138 118 116 100 107 
Percentage
A
  29 28 74 77 84 84 85 92 
N 654 644 189 180 140 138 118 116 
Notes:  A is the percentage of over-educated in 1991 but then in subsequent years it is the percentage still 
 over-educated in  subsequent years. Eg 140 men are still over-educated in 1996 from the 189 men 
 over-educated in 1991 or 74 percent.   
 This balanced sample consists of 1298 employed workers who have a full set of variables for 
 1991-2005.   
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 Table 3: Key results for the educational returns to log real gross weekly pay.  
 Men Women  
 OLS FE OLS FE 
Req Ed level = 1 ( 1γˆ ) 0.1178 0.1387 0.1594 0.1855 
 (0.0118)*** (0.0139)*** (0.0165)*** (0.0193)*** 
Req Ed level = 2 ( 2γˆ ) 0.2251 0.2267 0.3583 0.3528 
 (0.0108)*** (0.0141)*** (0.0099)*** (0.0151)*** 
Req Ed level = 3 ( 3γˆ ) 0.4955 0.4137 0.6210 0.5901 
 (0.0098)*** (0.0160)*** (0.0125)*** (0.0195)*** 
Req Ed level = 4 ( 4γˆ ) 0.5358 0.5152 0.8119 0.7650 
 (0.0131)*** (0.0226)*** (0.0133)*** (0.0260)*** 
Req Ed level = 5 ( 5γˆ ) 0.7669 0.6560 1.003 0.8862 
 (0.0119)*** (0.0248)*** (0.0132)*** (0.0278)*** 
Req Ed level = 6 ( 6γˆ ) 0.8570 0.7393 1.0718 1.0650 
 (0.0242)*** (0.0388)*** (0.0230)*** (0.0411)*** 
Over-ed level = 1 ( 1δˆ ) 0.1107 0.1064 0.0511 0.0940 
 (0.0073)*** (0.0091)*** (0.0072)*** (0.0091)*** 
Over-ed level = 2 ( 2δˆ ) 0.1783 0.1669 0.1325 0.2037 
 (0.0090)*** (0.0123)*** (0.0096)*** (0.0138)*** 
Over-ed level = 3 ( 3δˆ ) 0.2164 0.2832 0.2032 0.3450 
 (0.0111)*** (0.0160)*** (0.0125)*** (0.0179)*** 
Over-ed level = 4 ( 4δˆ ) 0.2579 0.3669 0.1984 0.4072 
 (0.0277)*** (0.0298)*** (0.0315)*** (0.0360)*** 
Over-ed level = 5 ( 5δˆ ) 0.3065 0.5872 0.2501 0.6575 
 (0.0474)*** (0.0432)*** (0.0741)*** (0.0814)*** 
Under Educated ( µ ) -0.0735 -0.0785 -0.0968 -0.1137 
 (0.0032)*** (0.0052)*** (0.0041)*** (0.0063)*** 
Constant 3.299 5.2429 3.215 4.6526 
 (0.0395)*** (0.0252)*** (0.0425)*** (0.0324)*** 
Observations 31776 31776 34904 34904 
Cross-wave person  id 6680 7314 
R-squared 0.61 0.60 0.68 0.65 
Standard errors in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Controls: age, age squared, children, spouse employment status, year dummies, regional dummy, union 
status, permanent job, part-time, promotion prospects, training, commute time, firm size dummies, industry 
dummies, moved home for and not for job purposes and employment tenure. The fixed effects specification 
excludes age and age squared given that the time variation does not vary across individuals. 
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Table 4: Returns for a graduate (NQF Level 5 qualification) by job requirement 
level  
 
    (i) OLS 
   
Men 
 
Women 
Level 5  ( 5γˆ ) 0.767 1.003 
Level 4 ( 4γˆ + 1δˆ ) 
( 5γˆ -[ 4γˆ + 1δˆ ]) 
0.536+0.111=0.647 
(0.12)***  [0.0124] 
0.812+0.051=0.863 
(0.14)***  [0.0121] 
Level 3 ( 3γˆ + 2δˆ ) 
( 5γˆ -[ 3γˆ + 2δˆ ]) 
0.496+0.178=0.674 
(0.093)***  [0.0110] 
0.621+0.133=0.754 
(0.249)***  [0.0129] 
Level 2 ( 2γˆ + 3δˆ ) 
( 5γˆ -[ 2γˆ + 3δˆ ]) 
0.225+0.216=0.441 
(0.326)***  [0.0127] 
0.358+0.203=0.561 
(0.442)***  [0.0139] 
Level 1 ( 1γˆ + 4δˆ ) 
( 5γˆ -[ 1γˆ + 4δˆ ]) 
0.118+0.258=0.376 
(0.391)***  [0.0291] 
0.159+0.198=0.357 
(0.646)***  [0.0348] 
Notes:  Log percentage points from the OLS specification in Table 3. 
 The penalties relative to a matched graduate are in parentheses, whilst 
 the standard errors of these penalties are in square brackets.  
 * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
 
    (ii) FE 
   
Men 
 
Women 
Level 5  ( 5γˆ ) 0.656 0.886 
Level 4 ( 4γˆ + 1δˆ ) 
( 5γˆ -[ 4γˆ + 1δˆ ]) 
0.515+0.106=0.621 
(0.035)**    [0.0157] 
 
0.765+0.094=0.86 
(0.027)      [0.0187] 
Level 3 ( 3γˆ + 2δˆ ) 
( 5γˆ -[ 3γˆ + 2δˆ ]) 
0.414+0.167=0.581 
(0.075)***  [0.0126] 
 
0.590+0.204=0.794 
(0.092)***  [0.0162] 
Level 2 ( 2γˆ + 3δˆ ) 
( 5γˆ -[ 2γˆ + 3δˆ ]) 
0.227+0.283=0.51 
(0.146)***  [0.0139] 
 
0.353+0.345=0.698 
(0.188)***  [0.0167] 
Level 1 ( 1γˆ + 4δˆ ) 
( 5γˆ -[ 1γˆ + 4δˆ ]) 
0.139+0.367=0.506 
(0.15)***  [0.0287] 
0.186+0.407=0.593 
(0.293)***  [0.0364] 
Notes:  Log percentage points from the FE specification in Table 3. 
 The penalties relative to a matched graduate are in parentheses, whilst 
 the standard errors are in square brackets. 
 * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
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 Table 5. Returns to a level of over-education by key cross-sections. 
  
1991 
 
 
1996 
 
2001 
 
2005 
Equation (2)     
Unbalanced Panel  (αˆ ) 0.065*** 0.065*** 0.083*** 0.079*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) 
N [4869] [3909] [4385] [3630] 
     
Balanced Panel  (αˆ ) 0.059*** 0.045*** 0.071*** 0.094*** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.008) 
N [1298] [1298] [1298] [1298] 
     
Equation (3)     
Found a match in 1996  (φˆ ) 0.123*** - - - 
 (0.024) - - - 
Differential between matched and OE in 1996 (pi ) -0.080*** - - - 
 (0.026) - - - 
     
Found a match in 2001  (φˆ ) 0.091*** 0.082 - - 
 (0.027) (0.049) - - 
Differential between matched and OE in 2001  (pi ) -0.041 -0.042 - - 
 (0.028) (0.05) - - 
     
Found a match in 2005  (φˆ ) 0.076*** 0.086** 0.109*** - 
 (0.027) (0.036) (0.031) - 
Differential between matched and OE in 2005  (pi ) -0.022 -0.049 -0.045 - 
 (0.028) (0.025) (0.029) - 
Equation (4)     
Penalty to matched now, previously over-educated,  - -0.122*** -0.118*** -0.10*** 
workers, relative to those already matched in 1991. ( λˆ )  (0.043) (0.041) (0.042) 
N  [897] [837] [772] 
     
Equation (5)     
Penalty to matched now, previously over-educated, - -0.147*** -0.114** -0.079* 
non-graduates, relative to those already matched in 1991. (θˆ )  (0.043) (0.041) (0.042) 
 
 
   
Differential in penalty to previous over-education between  
- 
0.151* -0.026 -0.095 
non-graduates and graduates (σˆ )  (0.09) (0.117) (0.117) 
Standard errors in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Controls: age, age squared, children, spouse employment status, year dummies, regional dummy, union 
status, permanent job, part-time, promotion prospects, training, commute time, firm size dummies, industry 
dummies, moved home for and not for job purposes and employment tenure. 
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Table A1 : Sample means by unbalanced and balanced panel 
 
 Unbalanced Panel Balanced Panel 
Variable Men Women  Men Women 
     
Real Weekly Pay 5.92 5.26 6.10 5.43 
Age 38.15 38.22 40.26 40.87 
Job Tenure 4.79 4.08 5.83 5.08 
Children 0.39 0.40 0.46 0.43 
Employed Spouse 0.56 0.63 0.64 0.72 
Non-Employed Spouse 0.16 0.07 0.15 0.06 
No Spouse 0.29 0.30 0.21 0.22 
Union Member 0.27 0.27 0.33 0.34 
Permanent Job 0.93 0.91 0.98 0.96 
Part Time 0.07 0.38 0.02 0.33 
Promotion Prospects 0.86 0.86 0.84 0.85 
Received Training 0.22 0.24 0.20 0.23 
Commute Time 24.43 20.40 24.33 20.94 
Ag, Forestry & Fishing 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 
Energy & Water 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.01 
Mining/Min Metals manu & Chemicals 0.08 0.02 0.09 0.02 
Engineering & vehicles 0.12 0.04 0.13 0.04 
Other Manufacturing 0.10 0.05 0.10 0.05 
Construction 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.06 
Dist, Hotels & Catering 0.15 0.18 0.13 0.15 
Transport & Comms 0.13 0.08 0.13 0.09 
Banking, Finance etc 0.12 0.21 0.12 0.22 
Other Services 0.16 0.33 0.17 0.34 
Moved house for Emp 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 
Moved not for Emp 0.12 0.12 0.07 0.07 
Lives in London 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.08 
No Quals 0.10 0.12 0.09 0.11 
HQNF=1 0.09 0.11 0.09 0.12 
HQNF=2 0.15 0.23 0.16 0.28 
HQNF=3 0.33 0.21 0.36 0.23 
HQNF=4 0.12 0.14 0.11 0.13 
HQNF=5 0.16 0.15 0.14 0.11 
HQNF=6 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.03 
Firm Size 1-24 Emp 0.29 0.38 0.24 0.34 
Firm Size 25-99 Emp 0.25 0.25 0.26 0.27 
Firm Size 100-499 Emp 0.26 0.19 0.29 0.21 
Firm Size >500 Emp 0.20 0.18 0.21 0.18 
Number of observations 31776 34904 9810 9660 
 Notes:  The unbalanced sample contains joiners and leavers as well as individuals that have experienced 
 spells out of work. The balanced panel is for workers observed in 1991 and 2005. 
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ENDNOTES 
i See the Department for Innovation, Universities and Skills Statistical First Release ‘Participation Rates in 
Higher Education: Academic Years 1999/2000 – 2007/2008’ (March 2009).  
ii Source:  Department for Children, Schools and Families: Education and Training Statistics for the United 
Kingdom: http://www.dcsf.gov.uk/rsgateway/DB/VOL/v000823/index.shtml  
iii This idea is usually associated with Sicherman (1991), who showed that the over-educated have, on 
average, shorter job tenure and work experience, consistent with the idea that they are in the early stages of 
their career.  Buchel and Mertens (2004), however, contest the interpretation of this evidence. 
iv The original source of this idea is Frank (1978), who used it to explain ‘differential over-education’ 
between men and women. The idea was discussed further by, inter alia, Dolton and Vignoles (2000) and 
Green et al. (2002).  Supporting evidence is provided by Buchel and Battu (2003), though McGoldrick and 
Robst (1996) do not find evidence in support of ‘differential over-education’. 
v See Groot and Maassen van den Brink (2000) and Hartog (2000) for reviews of this literature. 
vi For example, consider an occupation where a high proportion, say 75%, of the workforce are graduates.  
With the modal method, anyone with a degree in this occupation will be classified as adequately educated, 
as we would want them to be, no matter what qualification the remaining 25% of workers hold.  However, 
if some workers can enter this occupation without a degree (substituting experience, for example) then the 
mean level of education in the occupation will be less than a degree, and depending on the size of the 
standard deviation, all the graduates in this occupation could appear over-educated. 
vii See, for example, Gregg and Manning (1997). 
viii A single dummy variable for under-education was used rather than a series of dummy variables for the 
extent of under-education, as was done for over-education, because under-education is not the focus of the 
analysis here, as well as the fact that fewer individuals are under-educated as are over-educated, therefore 
reducing the possibility to use the flexible specification. 
ix An alternative explanation for a wage penalty staying with previously over-educated individuals even 
when they are matched is scarring, whereby the individual’s history of over-education is the cause of their 
lower wages, rather than specifically unobserved lower ability. 
x Given that equation (4) is estimated on a sample of matched individuals the γm parameters will be the 
same as if they were estimated on the 6 dummy variables for actual highest qualifications held. 
xi As in equation 4, HQit = RQit for this sample of appropriately matched workers. 
xii See Taylor et al. (1998) for a detailed discussion of the BHPS sampling procedure.  
xiii The balanced panel consists of 654 men and 644 women with pay observed over the full 15 years. This 
gives a total sample of 9810 men and 9660 women. This implies that only 26 percent of the 4869 men and 
women observed in 1991 were still in the sample in 2005. This is higher than the usual attrition rate for the 
BHPS which was around 50 percent in 2004, simply because we had to omit all individuals without a full 
set of 15 years observed wage data. Hence around 25 percent of workers left employment at some point 
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during the period observed.  This will include individuals who have retired, which implies that an 
individual fewer than 15 years from retirement in 1991 will not be in the balanced panel.  Younger people 
are therefore over-represented in the balanced panel.  See Uhrig (2008) for details on attrition in the BHPS.  
xiv Detailed occupational information is not provided at the SOC90 level after 2003 since this year saw the 
introduction of the SOC2000 measure. There is evidence suggesting that it is not possible to provide a 
direct mapping of SOC90 into SOC2000 at anything higher than the one digit level (see Elias and Purcell, 
2004). In some cases the occupational categories were too small for calculating the modal HQ. Those 
occupational categories that contained fewer than 30 individuals were amalgamated to similar categories 
within the same 2 digit level, so that sensible estimates could be obtained.   
xv All the estimates in this section are qualitatively robust to the choice of an unbalanced panel. All models 
were also estimated on a balanced panel where only individuals present in all fifteen waves were used.  
Results are available from the authors on request.  
xvi  See Sloane et al.(1999); Battu et al. (1999); Dolton and Vignoles (2000); Chevalier (2003); Chevalier 
and Lindley (2006); Green and McIntosh (2007).  
xvii The Chow test for gender differences across parameters provided a test statistic of 37.20 indicating that 
the structural determinants of pay differ by gender.  
xviii Where percentages can be calculated using [exp(β)-1]·100. 
xix If qualifications held are positively correlated with fixed effects because of unobservable ability, then we 
would expect the OLS estimates to be larger than the fixed effects estimates to the extent of the omitted 
variable bias. Indeed column 2 shows that this is the case for most of the over-educational returns. 
xx Full details are available from the authors on request.  The first stage employment equations where 
identified using a series of identification parameters. These included industry level redundancy rates in 
1992/3, regional unemployment rates in 1991, and individual access to a car. 
xxi Non-graduates workers who gain a match in 1996, 2001 and 2005 earn 0.147, 0.114 and 0.026 log 
percentage points less than non-graduate workers who were matched in 1991 (θˆ ). This differential is offset  
for graduates in 1996 since σˆ =0.151 which is significantly different from zero at the 10 percent level.  
